In recent years, there has been increased scrutiny of financial reporting and greater analysts and investors attention to indicators of potential earnings management, in particular, to cash and accruals relative to earnings and sales. We assert that, in response, firms have increased their focus on cash management aimed at aligning these variables, which has made the detection of earnings management more difficult. We define and develop indicators of camouflaged earnings management and use them empirically to test whether the alignment of cash and accruals with earnings and sales has intensified following the legislation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The empirical results are all in line with, and reinforce, our assertion. An interesting implication is that prior studies' documented decrease in accrual-based earnings management post-SOX may have been the result of camouflaged earnings management, and not necessarily an actual decrease in accrual-based earnings management. Our findings also suggest that any comprehensive investigation of earnings management may benefit from considering the possibility of camouflaged earnings management. 
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Introduction
The practice of earnings management has been discussed and documented extensively in both the academic and practitioner's literatures. The academic literature has studied earnings management through the manipulation of discretionary accruals (accrual-based earnings management), real transactions (real earnings management) or both.
1,2
Following the highly publicized corporate failures of [2001] [2002] and the subsequent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), financial reporting has fallen under greater scrutiny. Consequently, an important strand of literature has emerged examining the impact of this stricter enforcement of regulations on the practice of earnings management (e.g., Lobo and Zhou [2006] , Cohen et al. [2008] , Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal [2008] , Bartov and Cohen [2009] , and Cohen and Zarowin [2010] ). This literature argues that, post SOX, firms have faced stronger incentives to avoid the detection of earnings management due to the higher-quality audit reports and the higher cost of detected earnings management. The general conclusion of the literature is that following SOX firms have switched from accrual-based earnings management to the costlier real earnings management, because the latter is more difficult to detect.
The most common indicator of accrual-based earnings management is when accruals do not correspond to sales. Specifically, the literature has frequently examined accrualbased earnings management using discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are the difference between reported accruals and normal accruals, where normal accruals are primarily measured as a function of sales (as well as a function of receivables and gross 1 For manipulation of discretionary accruals see, for example: Jones [1991] , Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny [1995] , Dechow and Dichev [2002] Cohen, Dey, and Lys [2008] , Fairfield, Pinkowitz, and Tang [2008] , Bartov and Cohen [2009] , Cohen and Zarowin [2010] . 2 Earnings management typically has a negative connotation, though, in certain cases, it might be an activity that is rewarded by investors. A special case of earnings management is income smoothing; some practices of income smoothing have been argued to be desirable (see, for example, Dye [1988] , Fudenberg and Tirole [1995] , Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] , and Tucker and Zarowin [2006] ).
property, plant and equipment). An earnings-increasing accrual-based earnings management results in reported accruals that are higher than normal accruals.
If indeed the incentives to avoid detection of accrual-based earnings management have increased post-SOX, as argued in the literature, then another available option is masking the common indicator of accrual-based earnings management by assuring that accruals are closely associated with changes in sales. One means of achieving that is the conversion of accruals into cash to mimic the accruals impact of a true sales increase or expense decrease. Converting accruals into cash decreases the difference between reported accruals and normal accruals, and thus decreases the effectiveness of the indicator (which is based on discretionary accruals) in detecting accrual-based earnings management. 3 Converting accruals into cash is also applicable to other types of earnings management. In particular, employing a similar technique would make more difficult the detection of sales pull-in, which is one type of real earnings management. Specifically, the commonly used indicator in detecting sales pull-in (through lenient credit terms and/or price discount) is abnormal cash from operating activities (CFO). Abnormal CFO is the difference between reported CFO and normal CFO, where normal CFO is measured as a function of sales. A negative abnormal CFO indicates a possible real earnings management through sales pull-in. Converting accruals into CFO decreases the difference between reported CFO and normal CFO, and thus decreases the effectiveness of the indicator in detecting sales pull-in. 4 We use the label camouflaged earning management through accruals conversion (AC) cash management to describe the activity of converting accruals into cashdecreasing the effectiveness of the indicators of earnings management (either accrualbased or sales pull-in). Since such earnings management often distorts the normal association of cash and accruals relative to sales, AC cash management may result in: (i) changes in CFO that more closely follow the changes in sales, and (ii) accruals that more closely follow the changes in sales. AC cash management would then result in camouflaged earnings management.
Of course, prudent cash management and, in particular, the alignment of cash and earnings are also common management practices. Such activities may be an appropriate response to the significant changes in the economic environment during the period considered rather than an address of market concerns over the quality of reported earnings. 5 Furthermore, in recent years, investors have assigned greater weight on cash and thus created a stronger incentive for firms to manage cash. 6 Even so, such increased cash management activities may -intentionally or unintentionally -have affected the key indicator of accrual-based earnings management, and the indicator of sales pull-in, and thus have decreased their ability to detect earnings management. This concern should be of particular interest because many influential papers on earnings management have The unobservability of AC cash management leads us to analyze its observable delayed effect on financial performance. Specifically, we examine the forward variation of cash flow from operating activities relative to sales, the forward variation of normal accruals, and the forward variation of discretionary accruals. 10 Note we do not use these forward variations as additional indicators of earnings management, but rather use them as proxies of camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management.
While earnings management coupled with AC cash management may be impossible to trace, we illustrate, via a parametric example, that it increases the forward variation of "factored'' $105 million worth of receivables, selling them to a third party to raise cash. B&L argues this is a normal practice that doesn't require disclosure." (BusinessWeek, October 23, 1995) . 9 Anecdotal evidence of hiding factoring is the case of SEC V. Delphi: "From 2003 to 2004, Delphi hid up to $325 million in factoring, or sales of accounts receivable, in order to improperly boost non-GAAP pro forma measures of Delphi's financial performance that were relied upon by investors, analysts and rating agencies. Hiding this factoring allowed Delphi to overstate materially its 'Street Net Liquidity'… Delphi settled the charges, without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations." [Litigation Release No. 19891 (Oct. 30, 2006) ] 10 Forward variation of a variable at a given point in time is its coefficient of variation over subsequent quarters.
cash-to-sales and the forward variation of normal accruals, and decreases the forward variation of discretionary accruals. These three indicators later serve as proxies for AC cash management in our empirical analysis. Our analytical illustration considers three settings: (1) real earnings management through pulling in of sales, which impacts the level of (net) sales, (2) accrual-based earnings management through the manipulation of allowance of sales returns, which impacts the level of (net) sales, and (3) It is important to point out that these three forward-variation effects of camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management cannot arise from real earnings management (such as cutting discretionary expenses or sales pull-in), from increased cash management independent of earnings management, or simply from decreased accrualbased earnings management without a related change in cash management. We further discuss the distinction between camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management and these other activities in Section 2.
In the subsequent empirical analysis we use the above three proxies for camouflaged The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an analytical illustration. Section 3 describes the empirical design. Section 4 discusses the sample and provides descriptive statistics on the main variables. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results, while Section 6 concludes the study.
Analytical Illustration
We examine the impact of earnings management and cash management on key financial metrics by using the following parametric setting. Let S ij denote the "normal" level of sales for month j of quarter i, (j=1,2,3 and i=1,2,3,4) , and let S i S i1 +S i2 +S i3 .
Unless otherwise noted, sales growth is assumed to be zero. 12 Standard credit terms for both customers and vendors are 60 days. The firm holds an inventory level corresponding to next month's expected sales. 13 For simplicity, we assume the cost of goods sold (COGS) is variable, the selling, general and administrative expense (SG&A) is fixed, the firm has no property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (e.g., all assets/facilities are rented/leased), there are no taxes, and income is distributed as dividend at year end.
14 Formally, we let v denote the (constant) COGS per dollar of sales and F denotes the total SG&A.
From the above assumptions and notation it follows that the net income in quarter i
The change in NI in quarter i relative to the previous quarter is
Similarly, REC i , INV i and PAY i denote the (quarter-over-quarter) change in receivables, inventories and payables, respectively. Therefore, the total accrual in Q i is ACC i = REC i + INV i -PAY i . The cash from operating activities is CFO i = NI i -ACC i , while CFO i = CFO i -CFO i-1 . Following the accounting literature (e.g., Jones
[1991] and Dechow et al. [1995] ), we distinguish between Normal Accrual (NA) and Discretionary Accrual (DA), where,
NA = Assets PPE Assets
REC Sales Assets
12 That is, S ij = S km and S i = S k for all i, j, k, and m. The reason we maintain the subscript notation is to allow for easy reference to origin and consequence of changes in monthly sales. 13 Our analysis immediately generalizes to a number of alternative assumptions, including arbitrary sales growth, any length of credit terms and different inventory policies. 14 We have replicated the analysis of this section for the more general case that allows for PP&E, taxes, fixed manufacturing costs and increase in retained earnings. This complicates the notation considerably without affecting the qualitative observations.
Replicating the analysis for a measure based on the performance-matched discretionary accruals as proposed by Kothari et al. [2005] will not change qualitative insights.
We study three settings. 
SETTING 1 -REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE PULLING IN OF SALES
We first consider the benchmark Scenario 1.1. We assume a one-time increase, δ, in Q1 sales, and thus there is no need to increase the end of period inventory level. This leads to an immediate increase in NI, a partial increase in CFO in Q1, and a delayed increase in CFO in Q2 (due to the assumed credit terms). We assume, without loss of generality, that the sales increase is uniform throughout the quarter. The impact of this sales increase on the different financial metrics is presented in detail in Setting Summary 1.1 below.
[Setting Summary 1.1 about here]
In Scenario 1.2, the firm pulls in sales to Q1's third month from the first month of Q2
to increase sales and NI. We let β denote the percentage of S 21 pulled into S 13 . To mimic the true increase in sales and NI of Scenario 1.1, βS 21 = δ. For simplicity, we assume the increase in sales (above the "normal" S 1 ) comes out of inventory, and no change in production is necessary. We also assume the firm extends the credit terms to 90 days to those customers enticed into purchasing early. 15 The increase in Q1's sales and NI is offset by a similar decrease in next month's performance. By Q3, sales and NI return to normal levels. Note that this leads to increased variation in both sales and NI relative to the benchmark scenario, whereas the CFO level remains unchanged. Indeed, the discrepancy between the changes in NI and CFO is often viewed by the market as a red flag for potential earnings management and is sometimes used as a proxy for "earnings quality." Even more relevant for our study is the observation that the ratio of the forward variation of CFO to the forward variation of sales decreases (see Row 2/Columns i1-i3
and Row 13/Columns i1-i3). 16 Further, the forward variation of DA increases compared with Scenario 1.1 (see Row 15/Columns i1-i3.) 17 The impact of this sales manipulation on the different financial metrics is presented in detail in Setting Summary 1.2 below.
[Setting Summary 1.2 about here]
In Scenario 1.3, the firm attempts to mask its earnings management through AC cash management. For concreteness, we assume the firm factors receivables to replicate the cash impact of the true sales increase presented in Scenario 1.1. 18 Specifically, it pulls in βS 21 and factors receivables in the amount of 3 1 βS 21 (1-v), replicating in Q1 the performance of a true transitory increase of βS 21 in sales. As in Scenario 1.2, the increase 15 To assess robustness, we examined a number of other variations including: (i) more generalized pull-in assumptions, (ii) a scenario of no inventory where any increase in sales requires increased production/ purchases, (iii) discounts for early purchases. The qualitative results remain the same. 16 We define forward variation of a variable as its coefficient of variation (i.e. the ratio of standard deviation to the mean) over the subsequent three quarters. 17 When comparing DA variations, we assume α 2 '<<0.5; previous studies (e.g., Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna [2003] ) provide strong support for this assumption. 18 Examining factoring of receivables is appealing because it is a transaction regularly used by many firms (see, for example, Klapper [2006] , Levi [2010] 
SETTING 3 -ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE MANIPULATION OF ACCRUED LIABILITY
In the benchmark Scenario 3.1, we assume a one-time decrease, δ, in Q1's SG&A.
This leads to an immediate increase in NI and CFO in Q1. Setting Summary 3.1 details the impact this expense decrease has on the different financial metrics.
[Setting Summary 3.1 about here]
In Scenario 3.2, the firm manipulates the provision to reduce SG&A and increase NI.
We let δ denote the decrease in accrued liability and the related SG&A expense, leading to a δ increase in NI. 19 We further assume these changes reverse in the following quarter 20 and by Q3 expenses and NI return to their normal levels. This creates increased variation in expenses and NI relative to the benchmark scenario, whereas the CFO level remains unchanged (see Row12/Columns i1-i3 In the above analysis we have illustrated the effect of camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management on the three-quarter forward variation of cash-to-sales, normal accruals, and discretionary accruals. While earnings management coupled with AC cash management may be difficult to trace, this combined activity leads to an increase in cash-to-sales and normal accruals forward variations, and a decrease in discretionary accruals forward variation, compared with earnings management that is not coupled with AC cash management.
It is important to distinguish between the impact of camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management and the impact of other related transactions.
These transactions include: (i) cash management without a parallel earnings management,
(ii) decreased accrual-based earnings management without a related change in cash management, and (iii) increased real earnings management. The impact of these three related transaction on cash-to-sales, normal accruals or discretionary accruals forward variations is different from that of camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management.
If AC cash management is performed without a parallel earnings management, then while the cash-to-sales forward variation may still rise, the discretionary accruals forward variation is likely to increase, rather than decrease, as a result of converting accruals into cash. Note also that if cash management is performed without changing accruals, then normal and discretionary accruals will not change at all.
If accrual-based earnings management declines without a related change in cash management, then either the cash-to-sales forward variation or the normal accruals forward variation is not likely to increase. In case the accrual-based earnings management was originally performed to affect expenses through provisions, then the cash-to-sales forward variation is likely to remain unaffected by the decline in the accrual-based earnings management, because sales and cash are unaffected. On the other hand, when accrual-based earnings management was performed to affect sales through provisions, the normal accruals forward variation is likely to decline, because the decrease in accrualbased earnings managements reduces the variability in sales and receivables, which are determinants of normal accruals.
If real earnings management increases, then either the normal accruals forward variation or the cash-to-sales forward variation is not likely to increase. When real earnings management is performed to affect expenses through the reduction of discretionary expenses, then the normal accruals forward variation is likely to remain unaffected, because sales and receivables, which are determinants of normal accruals, are unaffected. Alternatively, when real earnings management is performed to affect sales through sales pull-in then the cash-to-sales forward variation will not increase.
Specifically, if a sales pull-in is performed through extended credit terms, then the cashto-sales forward variation will decrease rather than increase, because sales are fluctuate across the periods while cash is affected less or unaffected at all (see also Setting Summary 1.2). On the other hand, if sales pull-in is performed through price discounts, then the cash-to-sales forward variation is not likely to increase, because both sales and cash are similarly affected.
In our analysis we examine AC cash management through factoring; however, other types of AC cash management will yield similar results (e.g., current assets securitization, working capital management). While our discussion focuses on earnings-increasing earnings management and the accompanying cash management that converts accruals into cash, our analysis and inferences also apply to earning-decreasing earnings management and the accompanying cash management that converts cash into accruals (e.g., through working capital management).
Empirical Design
Our main research hypothesis is that SOX periods is consistent with Bartov and Cohen [2009] , who also use quarterly data.
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In our robustness tests, we also examine our hypothesis using three earnings targets sub-samples: firms attempting to avoid earnings losses, firms attempting to avoid negative change in earnings, and a meet-or-beat analyst forecast sample. Prior studies argue that firms tend to manage earnings to meet these three earnings targets (see, for example, Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] 
CASH-TO-SALES FORWARD VARIATION RATIO
Our first proxy for camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management is the cash-to-sales forward variation ratio (CTS). Cash is measured by cash from operating activities (CFO). We use the ratio of CFO forward variation to sales forward variation to capture the strong economic association between these two variables and to control for changes in the variation of CFO caused by changes in the variation of sales.
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We define CTS as the three-quarter cash-to-sales forward variation ratio, CTS FCV(Sales) is the three-quarter forward coefficient of variation (CV) of sales and is measured similarly to FCV(CFO).
23
In addition to using TIME, SCA and SOX as explanatory variables, we control for earnings (IB), accruals (ACC), book-to-market ratio (BM), market value (LMV), and capital expenditures. IB is the three-quarter forward mean income before extraordinary items (IBXI); IB t =Mean (IBXI t, IBXI t+1 ,IBXI t+2 ). ACC is the three-quarter forward mean accruals to total assets; ACC t =Mean (Accruals t /Total Assets t-1, Accruals t+1 /Total Assets t ,Accruals t+2 /Total Assets t+1 ). BM is the three-quarter forward mean book-tomarket ratio; BM t =Mean (book-to-market t, , book-to-market t+1 , book-to-market t+2 ).
LMV is the log of the market value of common equity at quarter end. Control variables for industry-specific effects and quarter-specific effects are also included.
24
The pooled regression model is:
In the analytical section we illustrate that camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management increases CTS. Our hypothesis is that camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management has increased significantly post-SOX, i.e., α 3 > 0.
In addition to the pooled regression described in Equation (1), we run time series firm-by-firm regressions and calculate mean coefficients in a manner similar to Fama and MacBeth [1973] . Running firm-by-firm regressions improves our ability to analyze the 23 To test for robustness, we also examine forward variation using the variance in the two or four subsequent quarters. Results (not tabulated) are qualitatively the same. 24 We control for potential industry-specific effects using Kenneth French's 12-industry classification: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. behavior of CTS over time, because the CTS pattern (like earnings management and AC cash management) may vary across firms.
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The time-series regression model is:
Note that for firm-by-firm regressions we do not need to include industry-specific effects as part of the control variables.
NORMAL ACCRUALS FORWARD VARIATION
In the analytical section we illustrate that camouflaged earnings management through We run the following regression model:
where our hypothesis is β 3 > 0. Time, SCA and SOX are explanatory variables as defined above. The control variables include FCV(CFO), FCV(sales), IB, ACC, BM, LMV, mean capital expenditures divided by total assets, industry-specific effects and quarter-specific effects. 25 We have also repeated our analysis for all indicators of AC cash management using cluster analysis as in Peterson (2009). Results (not tabulated) are essentially the same.
DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS FORWARD VARIATION
In the analytical section we illustrate that camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management decreases the forward variation of discretionary accruals [FV(DA)]. We define FV(DA) as the three-quarter forward variation of discretionary accruals (DA). FV(DA) is measured as the forward standard deviation of DA; FV(DA) t =STD(DA t ,DA t+1 ,DA t+2 ). Note that DA is normalized to zero by construction and therefore STD(DA) is not normalized by the absolute mean.
The explanatory variables are identical to those defined in Equation (3) . The regression model is:
where our hypothesis is that  3 < 0.
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The full sample used in this study consists of all firms with available financial data on
Compustat during 1989-2008; note, however, that this also requires data for 2009 due to the employed methodology. We exclude financial institutions (1-digit SIC = 6) and public utilities (2-digit SIC = 49). We require that firms have a market value of equity above $10 million, share price above $1 at quarter end, and for comparability a fiscal year-end on Table 1 presents the number of observations for each year.
The full and the reduced samples include 120,941 and 22,712 firm-quarter observations for 6,142 and 350 distinct firms, respectively.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 2 To test for robustness, we also use less restricted sample selection criteria, allowing the reduced sample to include firms with at least a third of the quarters before and after SOX. The empirical results (not reported) are qualitatively the same. 27 Following prior studies (e.g., Jones [1991] and Dechow et al. [1995] ), NA and DA are calculated using gross PPE, thus significantly restricting the number of available firm-quarter observations. To test for robustness, we repeat our analysis using net PPE instead of gross PPE (net PPE is highly correlated with gross PPE; Spearman correlation = 0.92), thereby more than doubling the sample. Results (not reported) are qualitatively the same. medians (0.85, 0.02).
Consistent with prior studies, the distribution of the book-to-market ratios (BM) is skewed to the right as the means (0.60, 0.56) are larger than the medians (0.47, 0.47) in the full sample and the reduced sample, respectively. Firm size, on average, is smaller in the full sample than in the reduced sample, possibly due to survivorship bias. Also in line with prior studies, 4% of the full sample are suspect firm-quarters with an incentive to avoid losses (T1), 12% are suspect firm-quarters with an incentive to avoid earnings decreases (T2), and 22% are suspect firm-quarters with an incentive to meet-or-beat analyst forecast (T3).
[ Table 2 about here] Table 3 [ Table 3 about here] Table 4 presents the effect of SOX on cash-to-sales forward variation ratio (CTS) in the full sample, the reduced sample, and the three earnings-target sub-samples. The three earnings targets sub-samples are: (i) firms attempting to avoid earnings losses, for which the indicator variable T1 is equal to 1, (ii) firms attempting to avoid negative change in earnings, for which the indicator variable T2 is equal to 1, and (iii) the meet-or-beat analyst forecast sample, for which the indicator variable T3 is equal to 1. We estimate the effect of SOX on CTS using regression equation (1) introduced in Section 3:
Empirical Results
SOX AND THE CASH-TO-SALES FORWARD VARIATION RATIO
(1) Our main research hypothesis is that camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management has increased post-SOX. In the analytical section we illustrate that camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management increases CTS, and consequently (as shown in the empirical design section), a positive coefficient on SOX is consistent with an increase in camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management. That is, our assertion is that 3  is positive.
For all samples (except the meet-or-beat analyst forecast sample), the coefficient on SOX is positive and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. That is, CTS increased post-SOX, which is consistent with our assertion that post-SOX firms have increased AC cash management, leading to camouflaged earnings management. As a robustness test, we repeated our analysis for a sub-sample of firm-quarters with bad news (negative earnings and earnings decrease) and a sub-sample of firms with no bad news.
For both sub-samples, the results (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar to those of the full sample.
[ Table 4 about here]
To better understand the effect of SOX on CTS, we investigate CTS on a firm-byfirm basis. Running the regression on a firm-by-firm basis allows coefficients to vary across firms, thus capturing firm-specific attributes. We run the following firm-by-firm time-series regressions for the reduced sample, and report regression coefficients and tstatistics in a similar manner to Fama and MacBeth [1973] : Table 5 presents the distribution of the firm-by-firm regression coefficients for the reduced sample and for the following three sub-samples of the reduced sample: (i) firms with a record for avoiding earnings losses, (ii) firms with a record for avoiding negative changes in earnings, and (iii) firms with a meet-or-beat analyst forecast record. A firm with a record for avoiding earnings losses is defined as one with at least one instance of loss avoidance; a firm with a record for avoiding negative changes in earnings is defined as one with at least 5% of its observations being cases of earnings decrease avoidance, whereas a firm with a meet-or-beat analyst forecast record is defined as one with at least 5% of its observations being cases of meet-or-beat analyst forecast. 28 Note that for the firms identified in each of the three sub-samples we consider all available observations.
We use these sub-samples to check for robustness because they potentially distinguish among firms based on differences in managerial incentives to engage in earnings management.
Results for all samples indicate that the coefficient on SOX is positive and significantly different from zero (at the 0.05 level or higher). Thus, they further support our hypothesis regarding the increase in CTS post-SOX. Together, the results in Table 4 and Table 5 strongly support our assertion that post-SOX firms have increased AC cash management, resulting in camouflaged earnings management.
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[ Table 5 about here] Table 6 presents the effect of SOX on the forward variation of normal accruals [FV(NA)] for the full sample and the three earnings targets sub-samples: (i) avoid loss (T1=1), (ii) avoid earnings decrease (T2=1), and (iii) meet-or-beat analyst forecast (T3=1). We estimate the effect of SOX on [FV(NA)] using regression equation (3):
SOX AND THE FORWARD VARIATION OF NORMAL ACCRUALS
For all samples (except the avoid-loss sample), the coefficient on SOX is positive and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. This result indicates that the forward variation of NA has increased post-SOX, and is consistent with our analytical illustration where we argue that AC cash management increases the forward variation of NA. These results support our hypothesis that firms have increased their AC cash management post-SOX, resulting in camouflaged earnings management.
[ Table 6 about here]
SOX AND THE FORWARD VARIATION OF DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS
Our analytical illustration also suggests that camouflaged earnings management through AC cash management is associated with a smaller forward variation of discretionary accruals FV(DA). We investigate the effect of SOX on [FV(DA)] using regression equation (4):
In Table 7 , we present results for the full sample and the three earnings targets subsamples (avoid loss, avoid earnings decrease, and meet-or-beat analyst forecast). We also test for robustness by considering two additional sub-samples with positive DA and negative DA. According to the Jones model (e.g., Jones [1991] and Dechow et al. [1995] ), positive (negative) DA is associated with earnings management activity aimed at inflating (deflating) earnings.
All samples indicate that the coefficient on SOX is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. That is, the regression results indicate a lower forward variation of discretionary accruals post-SOX, which is consistent with our assertion regarding higher AC cash management post-SOX.
[ Table 7 about here]
The empirical results presented in Tables 4 and 5 for the forward variation ratio of CFO to sales, in Table 6 for the normal accruals forward variation, and in Table 7 for the discretionary accruals forward variation are all in line with and reinforce our hypothesis that earnings management post-SOX was coupled with AC cash management, resulting in camouflaged earnings management. Also, in line with the analytical illustration, the combined changes in CTS, FV(NA), and FV(DA) cannot arise from real earnings management, increased cash management independent of earnings management, or decreased accrual-based earnings management without a related change in cash management.
Concluding Remarks
We argue that cash management that converts accruals into cash often reduces the transparency of possible earnings management. We assert that, in response to increased scrutiny and greater attention to cash versus earnings, firms increase their focus on cash management aimed at aligning cash and accruals with earnings and sales, which results in camouflaged earnings management. The increased scrutiny following the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act provides an appealing means of testing our assertion. The empirical results reinforce our assertion that post-SOX firms have increased their AC cash management, resulting in camouflaged earnings management.
We recognize it may be difficult to disentangle the SOX effect from the effects of other economic events that have occurred during the same period. 30 The increased focus on cash management could have been a response to such economic events rather than a response to the increased scrutiny. But irrespective of the motivation behind cash management, our results suggest that increased cash management activities have (intentionally or unintentionally) camouflaged earnings management.
An immediate implication of our study is that the decrease in accrual-based earnings  BM -three-quarter forward mean book-to-market ratio; BM t = Mean (book-tomarket t, book-to-market t+1 , book-to-market t+2 )
Setting Summary 3.1 -Real and transitory expense decrease
Quarter i i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 1 Sales S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 2 Sales 0 0 0 0 3 SG&A F -δ F F F 4 Δ SG&A -δ δ 0 0 5 NI S 1 (1-v)-(F-δ) S 2 (1-v)-F S 3 (1-v)-F S 4 (1-v)-F 6 NI δ -δ 0
CFO
S 1 (1-v)-F+δ S 2 (1-v)-F S 3 (1-v)-F S 4 (1-v)-F 12 CFO δ -δ 0 0 13 NA γ γ γ γ 14 DA -γ -γ -γ -γ
Setting Summary 3.2 -Accrual-based earnings management (decrease provisions)
Quarter i i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 1 Sales S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 2 Sales 0 0 0 0 3 SG&A F -δ F +δ F F 4 Δ SG&A -δ 2δ 0 0 5 NI S 1 (1-v)-(F-δ) S 2 (1-v)-(F+δ) S 3 (1-v)-F S 4 (1-v)-F 6 NI δ -2δ δ 0 7 Receivables 0 0 0 0 8 Inventory 0 0 0 0 9 ΔPayable -δ δ 0 0 10 ACC δ -δ 0 0 11 CFO S 1 (1-v)-F S 2 (1-v)-F S 3 (1-v)-F S 4 (1-v)-F 12 CFO 0 0 0 0 13 NA γ γ γ γ 14 DA δ-γ -δ-γ -γ -γ
Setting Summary 3.3 -Accrual-based earnings management (decrease provisions) + Factoring
 LMV -log of market value of common equity at quarter end Table 1 for sample selection and Table 2 for the definitions of other variables 5. *, **. *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Table 1 for sample selection and Table 2 for the definitions of other variables 5. *, **. *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Table 1 for sample selection and Table 2 for the definitions of other variables 5. *, **. *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
